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Terrorism security in the chemical industry: Results of a qualitative investigation

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Abstract

Industrial sectors are nowadays extensively confronted with anti-terrorism security. Chemical plants, in particular, face the necessity for increased terrorism prevention. This article discusses organizational security measures as they relate to chemical facilities in general, and to four chemical enterprises in particular. Furthermore, a general overview (used in the chemical industry as well as in other industrial sectors) of physical security components used to fight terrorism is provided. Four security hypotheses based on professional and academic literature and on internal documents with reference to the chemical industry are validated via in-depth interviews carried out in four chemical multinationals. Furthermore, recommendations are given to consider when striving for improvement in installing and continuously improving security measures in the chemicals sector.

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Notes

  1. There are a certain number of ECIs, the disruption or destruction of which would have significant cross-border impacts. This may include transboundary cross-sector effects resulting from interdependencies among interconnected infrastructures. The sectors envisioned by the Directive are the energy (electricity, oil and gas) and the transport (road, rail, air, inland waterways and ocean and short-sea shipping and ports) sectors.

  2. Permanent security measures are characterized by indispensable security investments and means, which cannot be installed by the critical infrastructure operator at short notice. Graduated security measures can be activated according to varying threat levels. The OSP foresees various regimes adapted to possible threat levels.

  3. The perimeter is the whole area between the site and the street and water's edge (in case a chemical enterprise situated in a port area does have a quay to receive ship suppliers), including the transition points between the actual perimeter and the site (such as entrances and exits).

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Appendix

Appendix

Guiding document regarding organizational security measures

  1. 1

    General security policy

    1. 1

      What does the security policy in your company looks like? Explain.

    2. 2

      To what extent top and middle management are concerned with security issues?

    3. 3

      Does a written plant security policy exist, formulated by the plant's own top management? Can it be improved?

    4. 4

      To what extent has the security policy been changed as a result of the 9/11 (and other) terrorist attacks or changed regulations?

    5. 5

      Will there be any changes in the plant's security policy in the (near or far) future? Why (not)?

  2. 2

    Organization, planning and documentation

    1. 1

      Does a formal Operator Security Plan (OSP) exist, documenting the entire organization (structure), roles, responsibilities, training and procedures? Describe the OSP. Can it be improved?

    2. 2

      To what extent has the organization, planning and documentation been changed as a result of the 9/11 (and other) terrorist attacks or changed regulations?

    3. 3

      Will there be any changes in the plant's security planning and documentation in the (near or far) future? Why (not)?

  3. 3

    Communication and cooperation

    1. 1

      How does security communication function within the enterprise?

    2. 2

      What are the experiences with bottom-up security communication? Can it be improved?

    3. 3

      How does security communication and collaboration with the authorities (local and higher) take place? Can it be improved?

    4. 4

      Is there effective and efficient security communication and collaboration with neighbouring chemical sites? Can it be improved?

    5. 5

      To what extent has security communication and collaboration been changed as a result of the 9/11 (and other) terrorist attacks or changed regulations?

    6. 6

      Will there be any changes in the plant's security communication and collaboration initiatives in the (near or far) future? Why (not)?

  4. 4

    Training, education and guidance

    1. 1

      What are the required competences of a plant's security manager?

    2. 2

      What are the required (security-related) competences of reception staff?

    3. 3

      What are the required competences of plant security personnel?

    4. 4

      What are the required (security-related) competences of contractors?

    5. 5

      What are the required (security-related) competences of company personnel? In what way company personnel is trained and/or educated as regards security issues?

    6. 6

      Does a screening procedure exist before hiring employees?

    7. 7

      In the case in which one or more employees are fired, does the company consider this as a potential security threat? Explain.

    8. 8

      Describe the organization and contents of security training sessions.

    9. 9

      What is the available budget for security training, education and guidance?

    10. 10

      Have the training sessions (organization and/or contents) or have the required competences changed as a result of the 9/11 (and other) terrorist attacks or changed regulations?

    11. 11

      Will there be any changes in the plant's security training sessions or in the required security-related competences in the (near or far) future? Why (not)?

  5. 5

    Crisis management

    1. 1

      If a security threat is detected, what is the plant's procedure to react to this threat? Does a crisis centre exist within the plant to capture threat situations?

    2. 2

      If a security incident occurred, what is the plant's procedure to react to this incident? Does a crisis centre exist within the plant to capture incident situations?

    3. 3

      Are security threats and incidents investigated in depth by certain (expert) instances?

    4. 4

      Are crisis management procedures solely based on existing security legislation and guidance or do specific plant rules and procedures exist?

    5. 5

      Have crisis management procedures or have security incident investigation methods changed as a result of the 9/11 (and other) terrorist attacks or changed regulations?

    6. 6

      Will there be any changes in the plant's crisis management procedures or in the plant's security incident investigation methods in the (near or far) future? Why (not)?

  6. 6

    Audits

    1. 1

      Are security audits regularly carried out in the company?

    2. 2

      What is the average cost to carry out a security audit within the plant?

    3. 3

      Did the 9/11 (and other) terrorist attacks or changed regulations lead to carrying out a security audit? When did the last security audit take place?

    4. 4

      Are any security audits planned in the (near or far) future? Why (not)?

  7. 7

    Third party verification

    1. 1

      How are insurance agents, members of the authorities or other people (third parties) kept informed about adequate implementation of security measures in the company? Do they visit the plant on a regular basis?

    2. 2

      How the company does make sure to be periodically informed about future security-related regulation changes or indeed of novel security regulations?

    3. 3

      Did the 9/11 (and other) terrorist attacks or changed regulations lead to an increased number of third party visits?

    4. 4

      Will there be more security-related third party verifications in the plant in the (near or far) future? Why (not)?

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Reniers, G. Terrorism security in the chemical industry: Results of a qualitative investigation. Secur J 24, 69–84 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2009.10

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