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Addressing pipeline security regime of the prospective regional energy hub Turkey

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Abstract

Approximately 35 per cent of the world's oil and 75 per cent of its natural gas output are being transported through pipelines. This has rendered the security of critical energy infrastructures (CEIs) such as pipelines as a vital issue of concern, even more so following the events of 9/11. This is the case for transit countries located in the Near East, such as Turkey, where the security of energy infrastructure is at stake daily. Although concerns are growing about a tight energy market with chronically volatile high oil prices and a lack of reliable energy resources, states and companies cannot afford to keep their CEIs unprotected. This is an important issue for net energy importer Turkey with its pledge to become the fourth largest energy artery of Europe and its growing energy thirst. In the light of these, the paper argues that it is vital for Ankara to address the kinds of threats (that is, terrorism, vandalism, theft) that Turkey's energy pipelines face on the way to becoming a regional energy hub.

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Notes

  1. As stipulated in October 2000 dated Host Country Agreement, the Republic of Turkey is responsible for securing/protecting BTC oil pipeline in its borders.

  2. Presidential Decision Directive NSC-63 enacted by the Clinton administration in May 1998 regulates the security of CEI in the United States (see http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm). Following NSC-63, the Homeland Security Act enacted in 2002 defines the responsibilities of the National Security Organization (for the whole text of the Act, see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ296.107.pdf). CEIs in the United States have been protected with full cooperation, partnership and coordination at all levels between the American government and the private sector. In order to achieve this task, the National Infrastructure Security Plan elaborates on each sector's critical infrastructure security plan by taking their differing structures and security needs into account. Hence, it has been aimed to have up-to-date security plans for each sector (for the report prepared by the US Department of Homeland Security in 2009 regarding CEI, see (http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp_executive_summary_2009.pdf).

  3. For the report titled ‘Working towards a National Strategy and Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure’ enacted in 2008 in Canada, see http://www.cwwa.ca/pdf_files/CIPlan%20-%20may%202008.pdf. Despite dependency of infrastructure facilities on each other, there is a variety of enacted regulations.

  4. For the report entitled the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), which sets out the principles and instruments needed to be implemented to protect both European and national infrastructure; see http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l33260_en.htm.

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İşeri, E. Addressing pipeline security regime of the prospective regional energy hub Turkey. Secur J 28, 1–15 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2012.38

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2012.38

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