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Prevention of white-collar crime through licensing: The case of the licensing of employees in the Swedish securities industry

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Abstract

Licensing programmes for employees in the securities industry have been introduced in an increasing number of countries and have become a significant element of control of the associated markets, which are important for public finances. This article documents the licensing programme in the Swedish securities industry, and analyses its potential to foster rule compliance and prevent white-collar crime. The programme’s knowledge requirements, sanctions system, reporting obligation and organisational structure are central components that are analysed, particularly regarding their ability to create predictability, confidence and interdependent relationships that can counteract risk factors for white-collar crime, namely, social disorganisation, responsibility diffusion, institutional market imbalances and isolated subcultures.

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Notes

  1. The Swedish licensing programme was established in 2001 (www.swedsec.se), a few months after an equivalent licence was introduced in the Netherlands (www.dsi.nl). Before that a similar licence was introduced in the American securities market, as early as the 1930s (www.finra.org), and in the British market, where it was introduced in the 1980s (www.cisi.org). In the first decade of the twenty-first century, similar licensing programmes were implemented in many countries, for example, Japan, France, Canada, Australia and Norway.

  2. The definition of white-collar crime and questions regarding which type of crime should be included in the concept has always been a contested issue (Friedrichs, 2009). In this article, I define white-collar crime as offences characterised by concealment, deceit or guile and white-collar criminals as ‘trusted criminals’ (Friedrichs, 2009).

  3. This should be considered essential given that people’s fear of questioning and contesting received orders and duties, despite realising that they may involve dubious or downright criminal methods, has often been cited as a contributor to white-collar crime. The fear that questioning and contesting will lead to lower status, fewer career opportunities and the risk of demotion or dismissal induces people to remain silent (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Clinard, 1983; Miller and Thomas, 2005; Yeager, 2007).

  4. I am grateful to one of my reviewers for raising this matter.

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  1. Department of Sociology and Work Science, University of Gothenburg, P.O. Box 720, Gothenburg, 405 30, Sweden

    Oskar Engdahl

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Engdahl, O. Prevention of white-collar crime through licensing: The case of the licensing of employees in the Swedish securities industry. Secur J 30, 385–400 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2014.45

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