Abstract
Many municipalities throughout the United States have enacted ordinances that allow cities to charge property owners fees or fines for excessive police calls for service to the property. However, there are few studies of the outcomes of such ordinances. This study examines the impact on the count of police incidents of a notice of potential future fees or fines to property owners in Anchorage, Alaska and Green Bay, Wisconsin. It was found that police incidents are reduced by 24–28 per cent after a notice of potential fines, with two-thirds of properties experiencing a decline in police incidents post-notice. The implications for policy and practice are discussed.
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Notes
There are studies of interventions aimed at reducing drugs at apartments, calls for service at motels, and violence at bars, but none that examine a more general fees or fines for service ordinance at residential properties.
Green Bay is the anchor city for the Green Bay metropolitan statistical area comprising three counties and a total population of 306 241 as of 2010. The discussion here is limited to the City of Green Bay – the area covered by the Green Bay Police Department.
I agree with an anonymous reviewer who suggested that a regression discontinuity design could be useful in evaluating the effect of a notice of chronic nuisances. This appears to be a textbook example of an intervention that is readily examinable with an RD design. In RD designs, the outcome is analyzed using a variety of local regression methods on either side of some threshold for treatment, or assignment variable (see Nichols, 2007, for a discussion of RD and its usefulness compared with other methods). RD is not appropriate here because the assignment variable – the number of qualifying calls for service – is not measured for all places within each jurisdiction due to the labor required to determine if a call qualifies for enforcement. One could use the raw number of calls for service instead, but this is a poor approximation of the number of qualifying calls and would result in measuring the assignment variable with error, which would violate a key assumption of RD designs.
Mobile home parks were excluded from the analysis for three reasons. First, different people may own the land and the mobile home itself. It is unclear in such circumstances who the appropriate controller is. Mobile home parks are also treated differently by AMC 8.80. The owner and tenant of individual mobile homes share liability. However, the owners of the mobile home park are not liable for fees under AMC 8.80. The data for mobile home parks is inconsistent in every data source; it is often unclear exactly which mobile home police responded to in the data provided. It was generally not possible to separate one mobile home from another in the property data as well. Mobile home parks are therefore best studied separately, using different methods. There is one mobile home in the data that was not contained in a mobile home park; the land and mobile home were owner-occupied and police incidents could be accurately attributed to the property.
The structure of Green Bay’s ordinance makes this somewhat less likely, given that it includes specific crimes of a nuisance nature rather than excluding certain crimes, as Anchorage’s ordinance does.
1998–2007 in Anchorage; 2002–2005 in Green Bay.
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Acknowledgements
Portions of this article were previously presented at the Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis Symposium, 18 June 2014. The author wishes to thank the Green Bay, Wisconsin Police Department and Anchorage, Alaska Police Department providing data for this study. Crime analysts in both departments – Michelle Arneson in Green Bay and Bryan Morberg in Anchorage – were extraordinarily helpful. The author would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.
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Appendix
Appendix
Anchorage municipal code 8.80
Anchorage Municipal Code 8.80 defines excessive police responses to residential property as more than eight (8) per dwelling unit per calendar year. A police response is defined as one or more officers going to the dwelling unit in response to a call for assistance, a complaint, an emergency, a potential emergency or reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity that was determined to be related to activities on the premises and which were reasonably preventable. Police responses do not include:
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False alarms
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Child neglect
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Potential domestic violence
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Potential stalking
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Sexual assault
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Medical emergencies for serious bodily injury or death
Officers from the Community Action Policing Team receive a report of properties that may be in violation of AMC 8.80 based on a query of computer-aided dispatch data. Each property and each police response is then reviewed by the officers. The narrative report from each incident must be reviewed to determine eligibility as a ‘police response’ under AMC 8.80. Potential domestic violence, for example, is defined as a variety of crimes (for example, assault, burglary, trespass and harassment) committed by current or former household members or romantic partners. Such details are typically contained only in the responding officer’s narrative report. As has been found in the context of arrest decisions (Black, 1971; Terrill and Paoline, 2007), the police tended toward leniency. If there was any question about the inclusion of a particular incident, officers would generally not count the incident against the property.
After receiving the notice, owners have 30 days to take appropriate corrective action. Fees cannot accrue during this period. Corrective action must be ‘reasonably expected to correct the cause of the police responses.’ Owners are required to provide written notice of the action taken; the police have five days to determine if the action was appropriate. The ordinance lists actions that may be appropriate, such as a notice to quit, eviction notice served on tenants, obtaining a restraining order, installation of new security measures and other actions recommended by police. Owners are specifically prohibited from relocating tenants to another unit and from communicating only orally with the person causing the police responses.
Green Bay city ordinance chapter 28
Green Bay City Ordinance Chapter 28 defines chronic nuisance and allows the city to recover the costs for providing police services for nuisance activities. Chapter 28.401 defines a chronic nuisance premises as an individual dwelling unit, entire building, or business at which three or more nuisance activities have occurred within a 12-month period. Nuisances reported by the property owner do not count toward the three (3) calls in a year standard. Nuisances are defined as any of the following that result in enforcement action (warning, citation, or arrest):
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Harassment
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Disorderly conduct
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Battery
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Lewd and lascivious behavior
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Prostitution
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Theft
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Receiving stolen property
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Arson
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Drug offenses
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Gambling
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Trespassing
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Weapons violations
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Noise violations
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Execution of search warrant or arrest warrants
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City of Green Bay Inspection-related calls where the police department responds
As in Anchorage, the narrative for each incident must be examined to determine if the incident meets the definition of nuisance in the ordinance. Unlike Anchorage, in Green Bay, much of this work is performed by a civilian analyst who has created a database to support the effort and track case history.
In general, the Green Bay Police Department attempts to resolve nuisances without invoking the formal chronic nuisance process. When that fails, the property owner is notified that their property is a chronic nuisance. The notice includes a legal description of the premises and a description of the activities that have occurred. The notice includes an order to meet with the police chief or his/her designee to create a written nuisance abatement plan. The property owner then has 10 days to submit the plan. Frequently, the property owner is inexperienced in crime prevention. The police department often provides assistance with the plan based on the specific problems faced by each property.
Owners can be cited for failure to meet with police and for failure to submit an abatement plan. The abatement plan must include contact information for a person living within 60 miles of the property to act as a point of contact. If nuisance activity continues more than 15 days after the chronic nuisance notification was issued and the property owner has not made reasonable efforts to abate the nuisance, the actual cost of police responses to additional nuisance activity can be billed to the owner. The Green Bay ordinance allows for flexibility in what is billed – owners that are making ‘reasonable efforts’ to abate the nuisance can be exempted from fees.
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Payne, T. Reducing excessive police incidents: Do notices to owners work?. Secur J 30, 922–939 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2015.2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2015.2